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NOTE
ECONOMIC SOLUTIONS TO NUCLEAR
ENERGY’S FINANCIAL CHALLENGES
Zachary Robock*
This Note presents a legal, economic, and regulatory roadmap to drive long-
term innovation in sustainable energy generation. Next-generation nuclear
power, which fundamentally mitigates many safety and nuclear waste issues, is
the focus of this Note; however, the economic concepts can be applied to encourage
solar, wind, advanced battery, and other sustainable technologies with high up-
front costs and low long-term variable costs. Advanced nuclear energy generation
is economically competitive on a long-term levelized cost basis, but suffers from a
timing issue—a large amount of capital is needed upfront, with repayment over
several decades, during which time significant capital costs can accrue (e.g., com-
pounding interest, often at unfavorably high interest rates). This Note offers solu-
tions to offset capital costs in both regulated and deregulated energy markets,
including tools to accelerate recognition of future revenue and to reduce interest
rates.
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INTRODUCTION
This Note proposes regulatory and economic solutions to drive major
innovation in clean energy generation. There is a particular focus on nuclear
energy innovation; however, the economic principles can be applied to any
project with high upfront costs and low long-term variable costs, which is
the case for many clean energy sources. Part I discusses the importance of
nuclear energy in the world’s energy supply. Part II explains next-genera-
tion nuclear technology (hereinafter “advanced nuclear”), including funda-
mental safety, waste, and efficiency benefits over today’s commercial
technologies. Part III details the economic challenges facing nuclear energy
innovation. Part IV provides an overview of the regulated and deregulated
energy markets in America. Part V proposes solutions to drive innovation in
regulated energy markets with traditional regulatory tools, such as rate reg-
ulation, Construction Work in Progress allowances, and Integrated Resource
Planning. Part VI proposes solutions in deregulated energy markets, includ-
ing first-loss catalytic capital, securitization of plant assets, and deliberate
use of energy and capacity markets. Ultimately, both regulatory models are
capable of driving energy innovation. Different tools are required in each,
but they work in surprisingly similar ways. Under both models, ratepayers
today would incur modest costs in exchange for long-term reliable, clean,
carbon-free, and relatively consistently priced energy.
Such costs are an investment with multifaceted returns. Clean energy is
a valuable end unto itself for environmental stewardship, public health ben-
efits, and energy independence. While some benefits may not take hold
during a single lifetime, others can be realized within years or decades.
Furthermore, delayed realization is not a compelling reason to shirk the
responsibility to help sustain the planet for future generations. This Note is
not about short-term energy band-aids; the motivating vision is to funda-
mentally advance beyond the fossil fuel age.
Clean energy also presents a means of driving the U.S. economy
through the 21st and into the 22nd centuries. New energy technology will
be highly valued as countries grapple with eventual fuel shortages and pol-
lution, while derivative technologies should benefit industries from trans-
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portation to healthcare and defense. The recent climate accords in Paris
reinforce the importance of clean energy in the world economy’s future.1
Next-generation nuclear power addresses the most important drawbacks
of today’s nuclear energy—it provides fundamental safety improvements,
can consume existing nuclear waste or generate only small amounts of
short-lived nuclear waste (depending on the technology), and need not be
located near a water source. Nuclear power has long been an important
component in avoiding harmful emissions from fossil fuel power genera-
tion;2 however, most commercial nuclear plants in operation today were
built thirty to forty years ago, and all rely on designs from the 1960s.3
Consider other technology built forty years ago—today’s iPhone has approx-
imately 12,000 times the computing power of the original Macintosh com-
puter, released in 1976.4 Nuclear plants are initially licensed for forty years,
after which time they should have recovered their upfront costs plus reason-
able profit and should be decommissioned as an improved fleet of power
stations comes online.5 However, this is not the trend in the United States.
Forty-year-old nuclear plants are currently receiving twenty-year licensing
extensions, and there is already talk of additional twenty-year renewals, for
a total lifetime of eighty years.6
1. See, e.g., Coral Davenport, Nations Approve Landmark Climate Accord in Paris, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 12, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/13/world/europe/climate-change-
accord-paris.html (“[T]he deal could be viewed as a signal to global financial and energy
markets, triggering a fundamental shift away from investment in coal, oil and gas as primary
energy sources toward zero-carbon energy sources like wind, solar and nuclear power.”).
2. World Nuclear Ass’n, Greenhouse Gas Emissions Avoided, NUCLEAR BASICS, http://
www.world-nuclear.org/nuclear-basics/greenhouse-gas-emissions-avoided.aspx (last visited
Mar. 22, 2016); Nuclear Energy Inst., U.S. Nuclear Generating Statistics, KNOWLEDGE CENTER,
http://www.nei.org/Knowledge-Center/Nuclear-Statistics/US-Nuclear-Power-Plants/US-
Nuclear-Generating-Statistics (last updated May 2015) (providing that, for the last twenty-
five years, nuclear energy has provided approximately 20% of United States energy).
3. STEVEN GOLDBERG & ROBERT ROSNER, NUCLEAR REACTORS: GENERATION TO GENERATION 4
(2011).
4. 60 Minutes, Inside Apple, CBS NEWS (Dec. 20, 2015), http://www.cbsnews.com/
news/60-minutes-apple-tim-cook-charlie-rose (interview by Charlie Rose with Tim Cook,
CEO, Apple, in New York, N.Y.).
5. U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY CO M M’N, FACT SHEET ON REACTOR LICENSE RENEWAL 1
(2012), http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/fs-reactor-license-re-
newal.pdf; Matthew Wald, Power Plants Seek to Extend Life of Nuclear Reactors for Decades,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 19, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/20/business/power-plants-
seek-to-extend-life-of-nuclear-reactors.html.
6. See, e.g., U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY CO M M’N, supra note 5; Nancy Slater-Thompson,
U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Almost All U.S. Nuclear Plants Require Life Extension Past 60 Years
to Operate Beyond 2050, TODAY IN ENERGY (Dec. 8, 2014), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/
detail.cfm?id=19091.
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This process is driven by short-term economics—the vast majority of
nuclear power costs are upfront construction costs. Once online, nuclear
plants have very low, very stable operating costs, so current operators can
earn substantial profit margins once initial costs are paid off. And construct-
ing new nuclear plants, especially those with fundamental technological im-
provements, is a risky and expensive endeavor. Notwithstanding these
challenges, investing in new technology is critical from a safety, environ-
mental, and long-term economic standpoint. Making such investments eco-
nomically attractive is the focus of this Note.
I. THE NEED FOR NUCLEAR ENERGY
Next-generation nuclear power should be a key component of America’s
energy supply. It is the only carbon-free energy source capable of supplying
reliable baseload electricity, which today is produced mainly by coal and
other fossil fuels.7 Despite some high-profile accidents, nuclear power has a
very impressive safety and environmental record, especially in the United
States, and especially compared to coal, oil, and natural gas.8 That said, the
nuclear technology in commercial operation today is antiquated—plant de-
signs and construction typically date back to the 1960s and 70s and generate
substantial long-lived nuclear waste. Next-generation nuclear technology,
discussed infra in Part II, can significantly improve on many deficiencies in
today’s nuclear plants in terms of efficiency, safety, and waste production.
Unlike coal or natural gas plants, nuclear reactors do not produce green-
house gases or pollutants that contribute to climate change, acid rain, smog,
respiratory illnesses, and mercury deposits, among other impacts.9 Other
lifecycle impacts of fossil fuels—from exploration, pit mining, drilling, hy-
draulic fracturing, leaks, and spills—only exacerbate these ecological and
human health harms. Renewable energy sources can mitigate these impacts
but come with their own environmental, economic, and reliability concerns.
7. See, e.g., U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Competition Among Fuels for Power Generation
Driven by Changes in Fuel Prices, TODAY IN ENERGY (July 13, 2012), http://www.eia.gov/
todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=7090 (providing that, historically, coal and nuclear supplied
most of the baseload power in the United States, supplemented by hydropower in some
areas).
8. See World Nuclear Ass’n, Safety of Nuclear Power Reactors, INFORMATION LIBRARY,
http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/safety-and-security/safety-of-plants/
safety-of-nuclear-power-reactors.aspx (last updated Aug. 2015); James Conca, How Deadly Is
Your Kilowatt Hour? We Rank the Killer Energy Sources, FORBES (June 10, 2012), http://
www.forbes.com/sites/jamesconca/2012/06/10/energys-deathprint-a-price-always-paid/
#21302e7249d2.
9. See, e.g., FRED BOSSELMAN ET AL., ENERGY, ECONOMICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT 211 (3d
ed. 2010).
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Biofuels, for example, can be grown on polluted soil to absorb toxins,10 but
the pesticides and fertilizer necessary to grow such crops on an industrial
scale typically end up damaging waterways.11 Furthermore, burning biofuels
still releases greenhouse gases, as does manufacturing fertilizer.12 Biofuels
are a good supplemental energy source, but they are not necessarily carbon
neutral (especially on a large commercial scale),13 and do not present an
independent long-term energy solution.
Wind and solar are beneficial energy sources and should be encouraged;
however, for grid stability and reliability purposes, “[a]s the U.S. incorpo-
rates greater amounts of intermittent renewable resources into the nation’s
generation mix, the need to maintain diversity in the baseload power port-
folio is critical.”14 A recent study by researchers from the National Oceanic
10. For example, jatropha curcas is a crop that can be grown on polluted soil to absorb
toxins that result from mining operations or other industrial processes, and its oil seeds can
be processed into biofuels. See Fang-Chih Cheng et al., Phytoremediation of Heavy Metal
Contaminated Soil by Jatropha Curcas, 23 ECOTOXICOLOGY 1969 (2014). After approximately ten
years, the soil becomes suitable for crops. Id.
11. See, e.g., David Biello, Fertilizer Runoff Overwhelms Streams and Rivers—Creating Vast
“Dead Zones”, SCI. AM . (Mar. 14, 2008), http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/fertilizer-
runoff-overwhelms-streams/.
12. ALT. FUELS DATA CTR., U.S. DEPT. OF ENERGY, U.S. LIFE CYCLE GREENHOUSE GAS
EMISSIONS OF BIOFUELS (2010), http://www.afdc.energy.gov/data/10328 (providing that over a
full lifecycle analysis?accounting for carbon absorbed in growth?most forms of biofuel are not
carbon neutral or negative, with the admitted exception of switchgrass ethanol, which fixes
carbon into the soil in which it grows); Robert Sanders, Fertilizer Use Responsible for Increase
in Nitrous Oxide in Atmosphere, BERKELEY NEWS (Apr. 2, 2012), http://news.berkeley.edu/2012/
04/02/fertilizer-use-responsible-for-increase-in-nitrous-oxide-in-atmosphere.
13. See, e.g., KELSI BRACMORT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41603, IS BIOPOWER CARBON NEU-
TRAL? 3–6 (2015); Biofuel Is Not Carbon Neutral, ECOWORLD (Feb. 12, 2007), http://
www.ecoworld.com/energy-fuels/biofuel-is-not-carbon-neutral.html.
14. MATHEW J. MOREY ET AL., ENSURING ADEQUATE POWER SUPPLIES FOR TOMORROW’S EN-
ERGY NEEDS 60 (2014). There are several ways to stabilize variable generation from intermit-
tent renewables. One argument is that reliable quick-response generation is necessary to
stabilize unpredictable generation from intermittent renewables; however, natural gas is the
main source of reliable quick-response generation (as is hydroelectric, but this is a limited
resource); nuclear cannot cycle up and down quickly. ANDREAS PICKARD & GERO MEINECKE,
SIEMENS AG ENERGY, THE FUTURE ROLE OF FOSSIL POWER GENERATION 7–8 (2011). A second
argument is that improving energy storage capabilities can help stabilize energy generation
with intermittent renewables—batteries or other storage mechanisms can be charged with
nuclear energy and quickly supply energy to the grid as needed. See generally RACHEL CAR-
NEGIE ET AL., STATE UTIL. FORECASTING GRP., UTILITY SCALE ENERGY STORAGE SYSTEMS: BENEFITS,
APPLICATION AND TECHNOLOGIES (2013) (discussing the application of technologies for energy
storage). Another factor in stabilization is the issue of reliability; nuclear is very reliable
whereas wind and solar are dependent on uncontrollable environmental factors. See World
Nuclear Ass’n, Renewable Energy and Electricity, INFORMATION LIBRARY, http://world-nu-
clear.org/information-library/energy-and-the-environment/renewable-energy-and-electric-
ity.aspx (last updated Feb. 26, 2016).
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and Atmospheric Administration and University of Colorado Boulder that
“pushes the envelope” shows that “intermittent renewables plus transmission
can eliminate most fossil-fuel electricity.”15 In other words, even with an
overhaul of the long-term transmission grid in the United States, intermit-
tent renewables cannot entirely displace fossil fuels, even in a scenario that
“pushes the envelope.” Another source of reliable baseload electricity is
needed.
Other than nuclear, options for reliable baseload capacity are princi-
pally coal and natural gas. Natural gas currently enjoys low prices and burns
cleaner than coal, but it is still a fossil fuel with harmful emissions, and
methane leaks across the natural gas supply chain, still poorly understood,
may undermine its climate change benefits.16 Furthermore, natural gas is
largely obtained through fracking that may harm groundwater,17 and its
prices are historically volatile.18 Natural gas is good in the short term to
wean off of coal, but an overreliance on it will pose substantial challenges
over the long term.
There is an escalating need for new energy capacity, especially baseload
capacity. New EPA clean air regulations are leading to increased closures of
coal plants.19 This loss of electric generation has not yet led to energy
shortages, but only because of the decline in energy demand caused by the
recent recession.20 As the economy—and energy demand—recovers, energy
adequacy is becoming increasingly uncertain.21 EPA regulations appear
likely to get increasingly stringent, leading to additional old plant clo-
sures.22 Moreover, if the EPA’s Clean Power Plan rule survives judicial re-
15. Univ. of Co. Boulder, Rapid, Affordable Energy Transformation Possible, Study Says,
PHYS.ORG (Jan. 25, 2016), http://m.phys.org/news/2016-01-rapid-energy.html (emphasis ad-
ded) (discussing Alexander E. MacDonald et al., Future Cost-Competitive Electricity Systems
and Their Impact on US CO2 Emissions, NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE (Jan. 25, 2016)).
16. See Envtl. Def. Fund, Extensive Research Effort Tackles Methane Leaks, WHAT WE DO,
https://www.edf.org/climate/methane-studies (last visited Mar. 22, 2016).
17. News Release, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, EPA Releases Draft Assessment on the
Potential Impacts to Drinking Water Resources from Hydraulic Fracturing Activities (June
4, 2015), http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/21b8983ffa5d0e4685257dd4006b85e2/
b542d827055a839585257e5a005a796b!OpenDocument.
18. See ERIN MASTRANGELO, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., AN ANALYSIS OF PRICE VOLATILITY IN
NATURAL GAS MARKETS 5 (2007).
19. Power Plant Closures, INST. FOR ENERGY RESEARCH, http://instituteforenergyresearch
.org/topics/policy/power-plant-closures/ (last visited Mar. 22, 2016).
20. PUB. SECTOR CONSULTANTS, ELECTRIC RELIABILITY IN MICHIGAN: THE CHALLENGE AHEAD 18
(2014), http://www.pscinc.com/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=CUGsO5sdBOs%3D&tabid=75.
21. See generally MOREY ET AL., supra note 14, at 30–60.
22. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, FACT SHEET: CLEAN POWER PLAN & CARBON POLLUTION
STANDARDS KEY DATES (2014), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-01/documents/
20150107fs-key-dates.pdf. But see Greg Stohr and Jennifer Diouhy, Obama’s Clean Power
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view, each state must submit a plan for reducing greenhouse gas emissions
to target levels set by the federal government.23 Nuclear power can be an
important part of those state plans.24
That said, nuclear power has its own environmental concerns—namely,
uranium mining, waste disposal and storage, and the risk of nuclear acci-
dent.  The proliferation of nuclear energy also increases the risk of nuclear
terrorism, either through a nuclear explosion or a dirty bomb.25  Advanced
nuclear is not a perfect silver bullet, but it is carbon-free and reliable, and
many of the environmental and safety concerns with current nuclear energy
can be addressed and substantially reduced by advancing nuclear technol-
ogy, as discussed throughout this Note.
II. INTRODUCTION TO GENERATION IV ADVANCED NUCLEAR
A central tenet of this Note is that nuclear power needs to advance, not
stagnate or disappear.26 The nuclear industry is at a critical juncture—invest
in fundamental, long-term design improvements and drive the clean energy
industry, or keep a low bottom line and trudge along with inefficient, anti-
quated technology until eventually becoming obsolete. Advanced nuclear
promises improvements in safety, efficiency, and the reduction, elimination
or even consumption of nuclear waste, as discussed below in Section II.A.
Today’s nuclear power plants are considered Generation II (or “Gen
II”).27 Gen I plants were the earliest prototypes and proof of concept, built
in the 1950s and early 60s.28 Today’s Gen II designs were the first commer-
Plan Put on Hold by U.S. Supreme Court, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 9, 2016) (discussing the stay on
implementation of the Clean Power Plan, pending additional judicial review).
23. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, FACT SHEET: CLEAN POWER PLAN: FLEXIBLE APPROACH TO
CUTTING CARBON POLLUTION 2 (2014), http://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2014-05/docu-
ments/20140602fs-plan-flexibilty.pdf; U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, FACT SHEET: CLEAN POWER
PLAN NATIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR STATES 1 (2015), http://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/
2014-05/documents/20140602fs-setting-goals.pdf.
24. See Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Elec-
tric Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,662, 64,901–02 (Oct. 23, 2015) (to be codified
at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60) (explaining that new nuclear power can be factored into a state’s plan for
meeting Clean Power Plan requirements, but existing nuclear power and nuclear plants
under construction may not be included).
25. See, e.g., Joe Cirincione, The Risk of a Nuclear ISIS Grows, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 7,
2015.  A dirty bomb is a conventional explosive laced with radioactive materials.
26. A recent nuclear construction project underway in Georgia is the first new nuclear
construction in the United States in 30 years. See Michael Reilly, U.S. Starts Building First
Nuclear Reactor in 30 Years, NEW SCIENTIST (Apr. 29, 2015), https://www.newscientist.com/
article/mg21829116-600-us-starts-building-first-nuclear-reactors-in-30-years/.
27. GOLDBERG & ROSNER, supra note 3.
28. Id. at 3.
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cial reactor designs and date back to the 1960s.29 The Generation III and
III+ designs in the pipeline today offer improvements over the current fleet,
but they are still “essentially Gen II reactors,” in that they utilize the same
fuel and coolant, employ similar backup safety principles, and result in sub-
stantial long-lived radioactive waste.30 On the other hand, Gen IV, or “ad-
vanced nuclear” designs, present fundamentally improved technologies over
Gen II and III, especially with regard to safety, efficiency, and nuclear
waste minimization.31
Air travel provides a good analogy. Early airplane technology involved
wooden frames and propellers.32 Upgrading to metal frames and propellers
was a design improvement over wooden parts, but still relied on the same
underlying propeller technology—much like Gen II to Gen III. However,
the change from propellers to jet engines was a fundamental design shift—
similar to a design shift to Gen IV reactors.33 The newest plant under con-
struction in the U.S. today is Gen III+ technology, akin to building an
airplane with a metal propeller (versus wood), but still shy of a jet engine.34
29. Id. at 4.
30. Id. at 6 (referring specifically only to Gen-III). But see id. at 7 (describing III+ as
evolutionary development over III, which themselves are just improvements to II).
31. GENERATION IV INT’L FORUM, https://www.gen-4.org/gif/jcms/c_9260/public (last
visited Mar. 2, 2016) (providing a very helpful graphic explaining the differences in nuclear
generations); MICHAEL FOX, WHY WE NEED NUCLEAR POWER 112 (2014) (“Generation IV reac-
tors are not just evolutionary improvements in existing designs but involve new
technologies.”).
32. Just the Facts: 1903 Wright Flyer I, WRIGHT BROS. AEROPLANE CO., http://www.wright-
brothers.org/Information_Desk/Just_the_Facts/Airplanes/Flyer_I.htm (last visited Mar. 22,
2016).
33. The analogy continues in terms of public perception of air travel and nuclear
power. High profile accidents in both nuclear and air travel weigh heavily on the human
psyche. Air travel is statistically the safest form of travel—safer than walking, riding a bike,
driving, or taking a bus or train. Peter Jacobs, 12 Reasons Flying is Still the Safest Way to Travel,
BUS. INSIDER (Jul. 9, 2013, 5:23 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/flying-is-still-the-saf-
est-way-to-travel-2013-7. But every bump of turbulence brings white knuckles and nervous
sideways glances. People often applaud whenever a plane lands safely. How often do passen-
gers applaud a bus driver for arriving safely or receive a pat on the back for walking safely to
a destination? Similarly, nuclear power has the lowest death rate per kilowatt hour of any energy
source in the world, including wind, solar, hydro, and other renewables. Conca, supra note 8.
The United States is the world leader in nuclear power production and has had zero deaths
in its operating history. World Nuclear Ass’n, Nuclear Power in the U.S.A., COUNTRY PROFILES,
http://world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-t-z/usa-nuclear-
power.aspx (last updated Feb. 23, 2016); World Nuclear Ass’n, supra note 8.
34. See AP1000 Nuclear Power Plant, WESTINGHOUSE, http://www.westinghousenuclear.
com/New-Plants/AP1000-PWR (last visited Mar. 2, 2016); Vogtle 3 & 4 Project Overview,
GEORGIA POWER, https://www.georgiapower.com/about-energy/energy-sources/nuclear/over-
view.cshtml (last visited Mar. 22, 2016).
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Gen IV reactors are not some far-off theoretical technology; several
have been successfully operated, accumulating approximately 400 total reac-
tor-years of experience,35 and there is increasing domestic and international
momentum in advanced nuclear energy. In 2011, thirteen countries, includ-
ing the United States, extended an agreement to focus their research and
development efforts on six Gen IV reactor designs: Gas Cooled Fast Reac-
tor; Lead-Cooled Fast Reactor; Molten Salt Reactor; Supercritical Water-
Cooled Reactor; Sodium-Cooled Fast Reactor; and Very High Temperature
Reactor.36 The first fleet of commercial Gen IV reactors are expected in
2030–2040.37
Companies in the United States are actively pursuing advanced nuclear
technologies. For example, FLiBe Energy is based in Alabama and headed
by Kirk Sorenson, a former NASA scientist and the former Chief Nuclear
Technologist at Teledyne Brown Engineering. FLiBe is developing a tho-
rium-fueled molten salt reactor.38 TerraPower is chaired by Bill Gates (of
Microsoft), and is developing a standing wave reactor—a version of a so-
dium-cooled fast reactor—designed by Pavel Hejzlar, who previously
worked as the principal research scientist and program director for the Ad-
vanced Reactor Technology Program and Center for Advanced Nuclear En-
ergy Systems at MIT.39 Transatomic Power, based in Boston, was founded
by recent MIT PhD graduates to develop a molten salt reactor specifically
intended to consume existing nuclear reactor waste, without re-enrich-
ment.40 A team involving University of Michigan nuclear engineers recently
developed a mechanism to simulate reactor materials’ integrity under the
stresses of molten salt fast reactions, which should help drive critical
R&D.41 Finally, among other initiatives, the Obama administration recently
35. World Nuclear Ass’n, Fast Neutron Reactors, INFORMATION LIBRARY, http://
www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/current-and-future-generation/fast-neutron-re-
actors.aspx (last updated Oct. 2015). From 1965 through 1968, a thorium-fueled molten salt
reactor was successfully operated at Oak Ridge National Laboratory and decommissioned
after achieving its proof-of-concept objectives. NEIL ENDICOTT, THE WEINBERG FOUND., THO-
RIUM-FUELLED MOLTEN SALT REACTORS 4 (2013), http://www.the-weinberg-foundation.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/06/Thorium-Fuelled-Molten-Salt-Reactors-Weinberg-Foundation.pdf.
36. See generally Charter of the Generation IV International Forum, opened for signature
June 7, 2001.
37. GENERATION IV INT’L FORUM, https://www.gen-4.org/gif/jcms/c_9260/public (last
visited Mar. 2, 2016); FOX, supra note 31.
38. See generally Our Technology and Vision, FLIBE ENERGY, http://flibe-energy.com/ (last
visited Mar. 22, 2016).
39. See generally TERRAPOWER, http://terrapower.com/ (last visited Mar. 22, 2016).
40. See generally TRANSATOMIC POWER, http://www.transatomicpower.com/ (last visited
Mar. 22, 2016).
41. Nuclear Reactor Reliability: Fast Test Proves Viable, UNIV. OF MICH. (Aug. 20, 2014),
http://ns.umich.edu/new/releases/22343-nuclear-reactor-reliability-fast-test-proves-viable.
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committed $40 million to two companies involved in advanced nuclear re-
search, X-energy and Southern Company.42
Internationally, India, which has substantial reserves of thorium, an al-
ternative to uranium fuel, has been aggressively developing its nuclear
power industry with a long-term plan toward advanced nuclear reactors,
including a Gen IV prototype expected to come online in 2016.43 France
has historically generated most of its power from nuclear energy and is
pursuing three Gen IV technologies.44 China is similarly increasing its nu-
clear power resources while developing advanced nuclear to meet future
needs.45
On the other hand, the technology still has hurdles to overcome. More
research and testing are needed to confirm the long-term integrity of mater-
ials used to contain the reaction.46 For example, some proposed salts can
react poorly with water (sodium is flammable in contact with water), but
others, such as FLiBe (a mixture of lithium fluoride and beryllium), are
more stable.47 Notably, many of the technological hurdles to commercializa-
tion can be studied and addressed simultaneously, rather than needing to go
sequentially.48 Therefore, more upfront funding can accelerate the timeline
for development.
A. Safety Improvements
Next generation nuclear technologies offer several inherent safety ad-
vantages over older reactor designs, including low-pressure operation and
passive cooling that eliminates the need for battery or diesel backups. Ex-
42. Henry Fountain, U.S. Acts to Spur Development of High-Tech Reactors, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 19, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/20/science/advanced-nuclear-reactors-de-
partment-of-energy.html.
43. World Nuclear Ass’n, Nuclear Power in India, COUNTRY PROFILES, http://www.world-
nuclear.org/info/Country-Profiles/Countries-G-N/India (last updated Feb. 26, 2016).
44. World Nuclear Ass’n, Nuclear Power in France, COUNTRY PROFILES, http://www.world-
nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-a-f/france.aspx (last updated Feb.
2015).
45. World Nuclear Ass’n, Nuclear Power in China, COUNTRY PROFILES, http://www.world-
nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-a-f/china-nuclear-power.aspx (last
updated Feb. 23, 2016).
46. DAVID E. HOLCOMB ET AL., OAK RIDGE NAT’L LAB., FLUORIDE SALT-COOLED HIGH TEM -
PERATURE REACTOR TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT AND DEMONSTRATION ROADMAP, at xvi–xix (2013).
47. Liquid-Fluoride Reactors, FLIBE ENERGY, http://flibe-energy.com/?page_id=872 (last
visited Mar. 22, 2016).
48. HOLCOMB ET AL., supra note 46, at xv (“[T]he required tasks can largely be performed
in parallel, resulting in a resource- as opposed to a schedule-constrained development path.
Thus, the key development challenge is not overcoming specific technological deficiencies
but obtaining the financial lift necessary to mature technologies with a payoff two or more
decades in the future.”).
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isting nuclear technology is akin to a car with the accelerator stuck at full
throttle that must be actively contained. Advanced nuclear is the inverse.
The reaction must be actively encouraged; if power is lost, the reaction will
fizzle out due to its natural thermodynamic properties.49  This is both a
challenge and a benefit to the technology.
Gen II and III light water reactors (LWRs) use water as both a coolant
and heat transfer medium. LWRs must be highly pressurized in order to
keep the water liquid. LWRs operate most efficiently at 500 to 600 degrees
Fahrenheit, yet water boils at 212 degrees.50 To keep the water liquid at
these high temperatures, the reactor must be pressurized to 1,000 to 2,000
pounds per square inch (for reference, a moose weighs about 1,000
pounds51), or 75- to 150-times normal atmospheric pressure.52 This pressure
makes for a fairly tenuous situation.53 Any water that escapes will flash
instantly to steam (often radioactive steam), building pressure in the con-
tainment vessel. If there is a loss of coolant—as occurred in different ways
at Three Mile Island, Chernobyl, and Fukushima—backup systems run by
batteries and diesel generators are supposed to keep coolant circulating
around the reactor.54 These failed tragically in Fukushima due to the inten-
sity of the earthquake and tsunami, which dislodged and flooded diesel gen-
erators.55 The batteries worked for a time, but didn’t last.56
One new safety feature of Gen III reactors is to store emergency water
above or nearby the reactor to deploy automatically and without the need
for power in the event of a power loss or other loss of coolant.57 This is an
improvement over Gen II, but is hardly a fundamental fix. The water stor-
age could become dislodged by the same event (e.g., earthquake, tsunami, or
explosion) that caused the primary coolant or power loss in the first place.
Moreover, many passive safety systems rely on intricate fail-safe mecha-
49. See Brookings Inst., Can Nuclear Energy Save the World?, YOUTUBE (Dec. 12, 2014),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YHwZJPBlwKc (at 1:30–2:00).
50. World Nuclear Ass’n, Nuclear Power Reactors, INFORMATION LIBRARY, http://
www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/nuclear-fuel-cycle/nuclear-power-reactors/nu-
clear-power-reactors.aspx (last updated Jan. 2016).
51. Alina Bradford, Moose: Facts About the Largest Deer, LIVE SCIENCE (Nov. 13, 2014),
http://www.livescience.com/27408-moose.html.
52. World Nuclear Ass’n, supra note 50.
53. Badaway M. Elsheikh, Safety Assessment of Molten Salt Reactors in Comparison with
Light Water Reactors, 26 J. RADIATION RES. & APPLIED SCI. 65 (2013) (“The single most volatile
aspect of current nuclear reactors is the pressurized water.”).
54. See generally FOX, supra note 31, at 210–12, 214–16, 229–31.
55. Geoff Brumfiehl, The Meltdown that Wasn’t, 471 NATURE 417, 417 (2011).
56. See id.
57. See generally Int’l Atomic Energy Admin., Passive Safety Systems and Natural Circula-
tion in Water Cooled Nuclear Power Plants, IAEA Doc. IAEA-TECDOC-1624 (Nov. 2009)
(describing various backup coolant systems).
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nisms—sensitive valves to detect changes in core pressure, or complex con-
densation and pressurization systems,58 which could be dislodged during an
earthquake, explosion, tsunami, or other physically disruptive event.  In
short, regardless of the particular backup system, the high operating pres-
sures and natural tendency for coolant to flash to steam make for an un-
avoidably tenuous situation, even with passive backup systems.59
In comparison, many Gen IV reactors will use molten salts, lead, or
sodium (referred to collectively as “salts” for simplicity) for cooling and heat
transfer, rather than water.60 Salts naturally become molten at the high tem-
peratures necessary to run nuclear reactors efficiently, so they need not be
highly pressurized. These salts also do not vaporize until extremely high
temperatures—sodium boils at roughly 1,600 degrees Fahrenheit61 and cer-
tain fluoride salts boil at roughly 3,000 degrees.62
The ability to operate at low pressure enables molten salt reactors to
employ a passive emergency cooling mechanism in the event of power loss.
During normal operation, the reaction occurs in the reactor core, which has
a drain at the bottom, like a sink, as shown in Figure 1.63 The drain is
normally plugged with a stopper comprised of the same salt used as a cool-
ant in the reaction.64 The salt stopper is actively cooled, keeping the stopper
solid.65 If there is a power loss, the stopper would cease to be cooled and
would melt.66 The reactor contents (molten salt + nuclear fuel) would drain
into a reinforced drainage tank designed to passively cool the contents.67
Unlike water, the salt coolant would not boil away, but would remain in the
drain tank and continue to cool the fuel.68 Moreover, many Gen IV technol-
ogies have a strong negative temperature coefficient, meaning that the reac-
tion slows as the temperature rises, thereby naturally cooling the reactor
58. Id.
59. Elsheikh, supra note 53.
60. Gen IV Systems, GENERATION IV INT’L FORUM, https://www.gen-4.org/gif/jcms/
c_40465/generation-iv-systems (last visited Mar. 2, 2016).
61. Los Alamos Nat’l Lab., Periodic Table of the Elements: Sodium, CHEMISTRY DIVISION,
http://periodic.lanl.gov/11.shtml (last visited Mar. 22, 2016).
62. World Nuclear Ass’n, Molten Salt Reactors, INFORMATION LIBRARY, http://www.world-
nuclear.org/information-library/current-and-future-generation/molten-salt-reactors.aspx (last
updated Jan. 2016).
63. See, e.g., Elsheikh, supra note 53, at 63.
64. Id. at 66.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
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contents in the event of an emergency drainage scenario and substantially
reducing the possibility of a meltdown scenario.69
FIGURE 1: ADVANCED NUCLEAR EMERGENCY DRAINAGE SYSTEM
Reactor vessel 
Actively cooled 
freeze plug 
Emergency 
drain tank 
B. Reduction in Nuclear Waste
Advanced nuclear technologies can also dramatically reduce both the
volume and lifespan of radioactive waste, which is one of the critical envi-
ronmental challenges in nuclear power. Different Gen IV designs reduce
nuclear waste in different ways. In order to achieve more complete burnup,
some Gen IV designs operate as “fast” reactors,70 while others utilize inno-
vative fuel mixes and processes.71 As shown in Figure 2, below, a nuclear
reaction occurs when a neutron “bullet” strikes a uranium (or thorium or
plutonium) atom, fissioning the atom and releasing: (a) energy/heat; (b)
more neutrons; and (c) nuclides, which are the resultant atoms from the
69. World Nuclear Ass’n, supra note 34 (“[F]ast reactors have a strong negative temper-
ature coefficient (the reaction slows as the temperature rises unduly), an inherent safety
feature, and the basis of automatic load following in many new designs.”); World Nuclear
Ass’n, supra note 61 (“MSRs [Molten Salt Reactors] have large negative temperature and
void coefficients of reactivity, and are designed to shut down due to expansion of the fuel
salt as temperature increases beyond design limits.”).
70. World Nuclear Ass’n, supra note 34 (describing the greater burnup capability of fast
reactors).
71. See, e.g., Thorium Fuel Cycle, FLIBE ENERGY, http://flibe-energy.com/?page_id=874
(last visited Mar. 22, 2016) (describing the reduced potential for transuranic waste due to the
use of thorium instead of uranium); The Science, TRANSATOMIC POWER, http://
www.transatomicpower.com/the-science/ (last visited Mar. 22, 2016) (describing their mol-
ten salt reactor, which “produce[s] much less waste per year than a light water reactor, reduc-
ing the total volume of waste by 96%”).
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splitting of the uranium atom.72 Nuclides are a substantial component of
the nuclear waste ultimately generated by nuclear reactions.73
FIGURE 2: NUCLEAR REACTION
Neutron 
Uranium 
nucleus
Uranium 
nucleus 
Uranium 
nucleus 
Uranium 
nucleus 
Nuclide 
Heat 
released 
Neutron hits uranium 
nucleus, causing it to 
split and result in (i) 
heat, (ii) additional 
neutrons, and (iii) 
nuclides. 
Additional 
neutrons strike 
other uranium 
nuclei, causing a 
sustained reaction. 
Gen II and III reactors are all LWR, which operate as thermal, or slow,
reactors.74 The water in these reactors acts as a “moderator,” slowing the
neutron bullets down in order to maximize the likelihood of a neutron bul-
let striking another uranium atom.75 Moderating (slowing) these neutrons
reduces their velocity and hence their energy.76 Lower energy neutrons re-
sult in less burnup of the fuel, resulting in substantial amounts of long-lived
nuclear waste.77 In contrast, fast reactors do not moderate neutrons, result-
ing in fast (high-energy) neutrons, which are capable of more complete
burnup (including the nuclides).78 “Fast reactors hold a unique role in the
actinide [i.e., nuclide] management mission because they operate with high
72. See, e.g., BENGT PERSHAGEN, LIGHT WATER REACTOR SAFETY 101–03 (Monica Bowen
trans., 1989).
73. Unfissioned uranium, plutonium, and/or thorium atoms (depending on the fuel
mix) are also substantial components of nuclear waste. See e.g., What is Nuclear Waste?,
WHATISNUCLEAR.COM, http://www.whatisnuclear.com/articles/waste.html (last visited Mar. 22,
2016).
74. GOLDBERG & ROSNER, supra note 3, at 4–11.
75. World Nuclear Ass’n, supra note 50.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. World Nuclear Ass’n, supra note 35.
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energy neutrons that are more effective at fissioning actinides [nuclides].”79
By more completely consuming the fuel and nuclides, fast reactors substan-
tially reduce the volume of nuclear waste generated.
Importantly, the waste that is generated will decay to safe levels in
approximately 300 years, compared with the 300,000 years it will take for
nuclear waste from today’s thermal reactors to decay to safe levels.80 Fast
reactors can even be used to consume existing nuclear “waste” as a beneficial
power source.81 The ability to utilize existing nuclear waste can eliminate or
reduce the need to mine for uranium, thereby reducing environmental dam-
age from mining and from long-term waste disposal.82
Fast reactors are not the only way that Gen IV reactors aim to substan-
tially reduce long-lived nuclear waste. Molten salt reactors operate as ther-
mal, not fast, reactors, but are able to achieve almost complete burnup of
the uranium fuel by using uranium dissolved in liquid salt, rather than solid
uranium pellets surrounded by water.83 This allows for (1) filtration of the
uranium-salt mixture, thereby removing certain fission products that would
otherwise slow the reaction down; and (2) the continuous addition of fuel.84
With proper filtration, the liquid fuel can remain in the reactor for decades,
enabling much more complete burnup. This process can also utilize existing
nuclear waste as fuel, thereby not only minimizing future nuclear waste, but
actually reducing the current stockpile.85
III. WHAT IS HOLDING ADVANCED NUCLEAR BACK?
OVERVIEW OF COSTS
What is holding nuclear power back from the “jet age”? Simply put,
“[c]osts remain the biggest hurdle for the nuclear industry.”86 Once opera-
79. Sodium Cooled Fast Reactors, GENERATION IV INT’L FORUM, https://www.gen-4.org/gif/
jcms/c_9361/sfr (last visited Mar. 22, 2016).
80. Andrew Tarantolo, Fast-Acting Nuclear Power Reactor Will Power Through Piles of
Plutonium, GIZMODO (Nov. 7, 2014, 11:40 AM), http://gizmodo.com/fast-acting-nuclear-reac-
tor-will-power-through-piles-of-1655683450.
81. William H. Hannum et al., Smarter Use of Nuclear Waste, SCI. AM ., Dec. 2005, at
84–85.
82. Id. at 91 (providing that there would “be no need to mine any more uranium ore for
centuries” if today’s thermal nuclear plants were all replaced by fast reactors).
83. TRANSATOMIC POWER, TECHNICAL WHITE PAPER 11–12 (2014), http://www.transatomic
power.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/transatomic-white-paper.pdf.
84. Id. at 11.
85. Id. at 6.
86. Toni Johnson, Nuclear Power Expansion Challenges, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS:
RENEWING AMERICA (Mar. 18, 2011), http://www.cfr.org/united-states/nuclear-power-expan-
sion-challenges/p16886; see also Ian Hutchinson, Letter to the Editor, Cost of Nuclear Energy
is Misrepresented, MIT FACULTY NEWSL., Nov./Dec. 2010, at 24 (“[T]he main issues for new
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tional, a nuclear plant can produce electricity at a marginal cost below that
of electricity from fossil fuels.87 However, high start-up costs (and the asso-
ciated cost of capital), long repayment periods, and regulatory uncertainty
put nuclear power at an investment disadvantage.88 Advanced nuclear
should prove even more operationally efficient than existing plants, but en-
tails even higher upfront costs, given the research and development neces-
sary to safely commercialize the technology.89
The levelized cost of advanced nuclear is competitive with other forms
of generation.90 Table 1, below, shows that advanced nuclear can have
levelized costs competitive with natural gas (with carbon capture) and with
coal (with or without carbon capture).91 Including carbon capture in future
energy prices is appropriate given the increasing trend of carbon regulation.
While it may take decades before carbon capture is required on every fossil
fuel plant, advanced nuclear is still several decades away from commerciali-
zation. Hence, levelized cost comparisons are most relevant for anticipated
future prices and technology, not today’s. Moreover, the cost of nuclear
energy is largely (if not entirely) internalized,92 unlike fossil fuel, which has
major negative externalities from carbon and other pollutants emitted.93
reactors are to demonstrate that their actual capital construction costs can be kept within
acceptable bounds, by building on budget and schedule, and to convince the capital markets
that the big outlay is a manageable financial risk.”); Charles D. Ferguson et al., A U.S.
Nuclear Future?, 467 NATURE 391, 392 (2010).
87. NUCLEAR ECON. CONSULTING GRP., NUCLEAR POWER & SHORT-RUN MARGINAL COST 1–2
(2014), http://nuclear-economics.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/2014-10-01-NECG-
Commentary-2-Nuclear-Power-SRMC.pdf (explaining that short-run marginal cost of nu-
clear is zero); U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., LEVELIZED COST AND LEVELIZED AVOIDED COST OF
NEW GENERATION RESOURCES IN THE ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2014 (2014).
88. Johnson, supra note 86 (citing J. DEUTCH ET AL., MIT ENERGY INITIATIVE, UPDATE OF
THE MIT 2003 FUTURE OF NUCLEAR POWER (2009), http://web.mit.edu/nuclearpower/pdf/
nuclearpower-update2009.pdf).
89. See GOLDBERG & ROSNER, supra note 3, at 14–16 (discussing the costs and benefits of
Generation IV nuclear reactors).
90. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 87.
91. Note that Table 1 uses estimates for levelized cost beginning in 2019, and it in-
cludes additional costs of carbon emissions of 3% of capital costs (roughly equivalent to $15
per metric ton of carbon emitted). Id.
92. See also Nuclear Energy Inst., Disposal, ISSUES & POLICY, http://www.nei.org/issues-
policy/nuclear-waste-management/disposal (last visited Mar. 22, 2016) (including approxi-
mately $29 billion already paid into the Nuclear Waste Fund); World Nuclear Ass’n, The
Economics of Nuclear Power, INFORMATION LIBRARY, http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-
library/economic-aspects/economics-of-nuclear-power.aspx (last updated Sept. 2015); Hutch-
inson, supra note 86.
93. See, e.g., Joe Confino, Al Gore: Oil Companies ‘Use our Atmosphere as an Open Sewer’,
THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 21, 2015, 2:06 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/
2015/jan/21/al-gore-lord-stern-oil-companies-fossil-fuels-climate-change.
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Only by internalizing costs of both generating sources can there be a fair
comparison of levelized costs.94
TABLE 1: LEVELIZED COSTS OF ENERGY PRODUCTION ($/M WH)95
Capital costs Variable O/M
Total levelized
(construction + (including
cost
financing) fuel)
Advanced nuclear 71 11 96
Natural gas (advanced combined
30 55 91
cycle with carbon capture)
Conventional coal 60 30 95
Coal gasification with carbon
97 38 147
capture
As shown in Table 1, the primary expense in advanced nuclear is capital
cost, which is comprised largely of construction and financing costs.96
Critically, the estimates in Table 1 use a 30-year lifecycle for estimating
costs, but nuclear plants are designed to run for at least 40 years.97 If the
lifecycle analysis from Table 1 is extended to 40, 50, 60 years, the levelized
cost of advanced nuclear will decline precipitously as one-time upfront
construction costs are spread over a longer time period. Variable costs of
94. Some may argue that the risk of nuclear accident is nonetheless externalized to
society. That is true to some extent, but then so are the risks of coal ash spills, fracking fluid
leaks, or other fossil fuel-related accidents. Moreover, the nuclear industry collectively holds
approximately $12 billion in accident insurance, more than enough to cover the $1 billion in
costs from a relatively modest accident like the one that occurred at Three Mile Island,
though admittedly shy of the $100 billion estimated cost of cleaning up Fukushima. Nuclear
Liability Insurance (Price-Anderson Act), NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. CO M M’R & THE CTR. FOR INS.
POLICY & RESEARCH, http://www.naic.org/cipr_topics/topic_nuclear_liability_insurance.htm
(last updated Jan. 5, 2016). Others may argue that the storage costs of spent nuclear fuel are
externalized; however (a) there is approximately $29 billion currently in the Nuclear Waste
Fund, which has been funded by a one-tenth of one cent toll on every kilowatt-hour of
electricity produced at nuclear plants pursuant to the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1983; and
(b) the advanced nuclear technology proposed in this Note would generate relatively small
amounts of nuclear waste, and some technologies can actually consume existing waste. Nu-
clear Energy Inst., supra note 91.
95. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 87. Note that the term “advanced nuclear”
here reflects its use by the EIA and does not necessarily reflect Gen IV. The EIA does not
further define “advanced nuclear” in its estimates. Also, note that capital costs and variable
costs are not the only two components to total levelized cost, which is why the first two
columns do not add up to the third column. Fixed operating and maintenance costs and
transmission investments also contribute some costs. For full details, see id.
96. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., UPDATED CAPITAL COST ESTIMATES FOR UTILITY SCALE
ELECTRICITY GENERATING PLANTS, at app. B (2013).
97. See, e.g., U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY CO M M’N, supra note 5.
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nuclear are very low and very stable.98 The same is not true for natural gas,
which has substantial variable costs, even in the current climate of low
natural gas prices.99 Natural gas prices can be volatile,100 and any sustained
increase in natural gas pricing could make advanced nuclear even more
economically attractive in terms of long-term levelized cost.
The upshot is that the capital problem with advanced nuclear is mainly
one of timing, not levelized costs. More specifically, there are three critical
challenges to financing nuclear energy projects. First, simply obtaining the
billions of dollars necessary for an advanced reactor is a substantial hurdle.
Capital cost estimates range from as little as $1.7 billion101 to around $5
billion102 and up. A recent Gen III nuclear construction project underway
in Georgia (the first new nuclear construction in the U.S. in 30 years103) is
estimated to cost around $4 billion per reactor (Georgia is building two
1,110 megawatt (MW) reactors side by side, for a total cost around $8
billion).104 Second, obtaining billions of dollars will entail significant
financing costs since few, if any, companies can bootstrap such a project.
98. Nuclear Energy Inst., Electricity Supply, WHY NUCLEAR ENERGY?, http://www.nei.org/
Why-Nuclear-Energy/Reliable-Affordable-Energy/Electricity-Supply (last visited Mar. 22,
2016) (“Nuclear energy has tremendous price stability because fuel accounts for just 31
percent of production costs. Fuel costs are closer to 80 or 90 percent when electricity is
produced by burning coal or natural gas. This makes electricity from fossil-fuel plants highly
susceptible to fluctuations in coal and gas prices.”); see also NUCLEAR ECON. CONSULTING GRP.,
supra note 86 (explaining that short-run marginal cost of nuclear is zero); NUCLEAR MATTERS, 5.
NUCLEAR BENEFITS: ECONOMIC ENGINES 2 (2014), http://www.nuclearmatters.com/resources/
document/Nuclear-Matters-Economic-Engines.pdf (the fifth in a series of fact sheets by
Nuclear Matters); U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 87, at 6, 10.
99. SOFYA ALTERMAN, OXFORD INST. FOR ENERGY STUDIES, NATURAL GAS PRICE VOLATILITY IN
THE U.K. AND NORTH AMERICA 23–25 (2012).
100. Id.
101. Kevin Bullis, Safer Nuclear Power, at Half the Price, MIT TECH. REV. (Mar. 12,
2013), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/512321/safer-nuclear-power-at-half-the-price/
(“[Transatomic] estimates that it can build a plant based on such a reactor for $1.7
billion . . . .”).
102. World Nuclear Ass’n, supra note 35 (citing a 2010 estimate for a 600 megawatt
sodium-cooled fast reactor at 4.286 billion Euros).
103. Reilly, supra note 26.
104. Press Release, The White House, Obama Administration Announces Loan
Guarantees to Construct New Nuclear Power Reactors in Georgia (Feb. 16, 2010), https://
www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/obama-administration-announces-loan-guarantees-
construct-new-nuclear-power-reactors; GEORGIA POWER, THIRTEENTH SEMI-ANNUAL VOGTLE
CONSTRUCTION MONITORING REPORT 6 (2015) (providing a total capital and financing cost of
$6.113 billion). For a detailed treatment of how to estimate advanced nuclear costs, see
generally Econ. Modeling Working Grp., Generation IV Int’l Forum, Cost Estimating
Guidelines for Generation IV Nuclear Energy Systems, GIF/EMWG/2007/004 (Revision 4.2
Sept. 26, 2007), https://www.gen-4.org/gif/upload/docs/application/pdf/2013-09/
emwg_guidelines.pdf.
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Compounding interest will add significant costs to an already expensive
project. Moreover, debt funding of advanced nuclear will probably require
interest rate premiums given the substantial risks—strict regulations, new
technology, minimal track record, and uncertain energy prices.105 Third, the
repayment period can be up to 30 years or more, longer than many sources
of capital are willing to wait.106
IV. BRIEF OVERVIEW OF UNITED STATES ENERGY MARKETS
The balance of this Note will explore the three core nuclear financing
challenges discussed in Part III, supra, and propose solutions under the two
prevailing energy regulation models: (a) a market in which regulated utili-
ties own generation assets with rate regulation; and (b) a market in which
independent power producers (IPPs) own generation assets without rate
regulation. Historically, all energy markets were regulated, but beginning in
the early 1970s and accelerating in the 1990s, certain legislative, judicial, and
regulatory actions allowed states to deregulate their energy markets.107
In a regulated energy market, public utilities are vertically integrated
and own all three major aspects of energy production—energy generation
(i.e., power plants), energy transmission (i.e., power lines that transmit en-
ergy from the power plant to the neighborhood), and distribution (i.e.,
power lines from the street to the house, including billing). As discussed
further infra, energy rates in a regulated market are determined by a public
service commission (PSC) according to a particular formula and
methodology.
The specific contours of deregulated energy markets can vary by state,
but deregulation generally means that public utilities are prohibited from
owning generation assets.108 They can and are still involved in transmission
105. See Cost of Capital, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/costof
capital.asp (last visited Mar. 22, 2016) (“In general, newer enterprises with limited operating
histories will have higher costs of capital than established companies with a solid track
record, since lenders and investors will demand a higher risk premium for the former.”).
106. ENERGY FAIR, THE FINANCIAL RISKS OF INVESTING IN NEW NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS 2
(2012).
107. Robin Deliso, Regulated and Deregulated Energy Markets, Explained, ENERGYSMART
(June 27, 2014), http://www.energysmart.enernoc.com/regulated-and-deregulated-energy-
markets-explained/.
108. See, e.g., ME. STAT. tit. 35-A § 3204 (2010) (requiring utilities to divest all genera-
tion assets, with some exceptions including nuclear power plants); see also Consumers En-
ergy, DTE Energy, & Mich. Elec. & Gas Ass’n, Joint Response from Consumers Energy,
DTE, and MEGA to Electric Choice Questions 18 and 19 (2013), https://www.michigan.
gov/documents/energy/Electric_Choice_Questions_18_and_19_response_from_DTE_Con-
sumers_and_MEGA_419093_7.pdf (responding to questions posed by the Michigan Agency
for Energy “to educate the citizens of Michigan about electric choice,” Mich. Agency for
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and distribution, but cannot own generation assets in that state.109 One mo-
tivation behind deregulation is to foster competition in the generation of
energy by giving customers a choice in their energy providers.110 In deregu-
lated markets, energy prices are not determined by a PSC; they are deter-
mined by market forces, although some rate caps and controls still exist.111
The takeaway for this Note in the regulated versus deregulated market
debate is not that one is better than the other in terms of energy innovation.
Rather, both are capable of fostering innovation; however, different tools
are required in each. Direct regulatory policy is required in regulated mar-
kets, whereas deliberate market structures and temporary incentives will
help foster innovation in deregulated markets.
V. ENERGY INNOVATION IN A REGULATED ENERGY MARKET
Despite the levelized cost competitiveness discussed above, many utili-
ties are hesitant to invest in new nuclear generation. The top ten investor-
owned utilities in the United States range in market capitalization from
approximately $18 billion to $50 billion.112 Bootstrapping advanced nuclear
construction—estimated to cost anywhere from $1.7 billion to $5 billion,
and up113—is out of the question for all but the absolute largest utilities,
which even then probably have insufficient cash on hand. Traditional regu-
latory tools can help mitigate these issues, driving advanced nuclear energy
development and construction. This section will first explain the mechanics
and incentives of government-regulated electricity rates. It will next recom-
mend a regulatory allowance called Construction Work in Progress
(CWIP), which can help offset compounding interest costs. The section
concludes by suggesting a regulatory management regime called Integrated
Resource Planning (IRP) which can help incentivize investment at the out-
set and provide sufficient long-term revenue for utilities that make the nec-
essary investments in advanced nuclear.  These concepts, in and of
themselves, are not particularly novel; the purpose of this section is to ex-
Energy, Electric Choice, ENERGY POLICY REPORTS, https://www.michigan.gov/energy/0,4580,7-
230-72200_68204_54287—-,00.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2016)); STEVE FERREY, THE NEW
RULES: A GUIDE TO ELECTRIC MARKET REGULATION 164, 319 (2000).
109. FERREY, supra note 108; Deregulation, JUSTENERGY, https://www.justenergy.com/en-
ergy-explained/deregulation/ (last visited Mar. 22, 2016).
110. Deregulation, JUSTENERGY, supra note 109.
111. Id.
112. Largest Electric Utilities in the U.S. in 2015, Based on Market Value, STATISTA, http://
www.statista.com/statistics/237773/the-largest-electric-utilities-in-the-us-based-on-market-
value/ (last visited Mar. 22, 2016).
113. See Bullis, supra note 100; World Nuclear Ass’n, supra note 35.
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amine the challenges and present a path to advanced nuclear in a traditional
regulated market.
A. Traditional Rate Regulation
The way that electricity prices are determined in a regulated energy
market provides incentives for capital investments; however, such incentives
do not necessarily incentivize innovation. A regulated utility in a regulated
market charges customers rates approved by a PSC according to a cost-of-
service formula. The rates are determined using the formula O + B(r) = R,
in which O = operating expenses, B = base rate, r = rate of return, and R =
revenue requirement.114 More specifically, O stands for operating costs,
which are typically defined as expenses consumed within one year. B repre-
sents a utility’s capital investments—its property, plant, and equipment.
Lowercase r stands for the rate of return on capital assets that the utility is
entitled to earn, typically around 10%.115 Note that while capital assets, B,
earn a rate of return, operating expenses, O, do not. R represents the total
amount of revenue that the utility needs to collect from ratepayers. Roughly
speaking, R divided by the number of kilowatt-hours of electricity projected
for the upcoming year will yield the price per kilowatt-hour of electricity
charged to ratepayers.
A utility with both generation and distribution capabilities still must
separate these two functions pursuant to FERC Order 888.116 The genera-
tion arm produces power and sells it through the energy markets or bilateral
power purchase agreements (PPAs).117 Similarly, the distribution arm has to
buy power either through energy markets or PPAs. The cost of purchasing
energy through either means is incorporated into the rate formula as an
operating expense on which the utility will not earn a rate of return. How-
ever, the utility does still earn a rate of return on capital assets that it owns,
including power generation facilities.
114. BOSSELMAN ET AL., supra note 9, at 65.
115. Coley Girouard, How Do Electric Utilities Make Money?, ADVANCED ENERGY ECON-
OMY: ADVANCED ENERGY PERSPECTIVES (Apr. 23, 2015, 2:05 PM), http://blog.aee.net/how-do-
electric-utilities-make-money (providing that the average return on equity for United States
utilities is approximately 10%).
116. FERC Order 888 requires a utility that owned generation and transmission assets
to essentially deal with itself at arms-length, such that utility-owned generation would need
to compete with Independent Power Producers (IPPs) on an even playing field, without
discriminatory tariffs toward the IPPs. 18 C.F.R. pt. 35 (2012).
117. For an explanation of energy markets, see generally FED. ENERGY REGULATORY
CO M M’N, ENERGY PRIMER (2015) and MATTHEW J. MOREY, POWER MARKET AUCTION DESIGN RULES
AND LESSONS IN MARKET BASED CONTROL FOR THE NEW ELECTRIC INDUSTRY (2001).
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The return-on-capital-investment aspect provides a financial incentive
for utilities to invest in generation. Moreover, the increased likelihood of
cost recovery and price stability from rate regulation reduces uncertainty
surrounding the project’s likely success, which should reduce the interest
rate premium required for an advanced nuclear construction.
Despite rate regulation’s incentives for capital investment, there are
powerful competing economic forces against investment in innovative en-
ergy sources. Investment in advanced nuclear requires major upfront invest-
ment and entails substantial financing costs. Many generation assets
operating today have already been paid in full and generate electricity at
very low marginal costs, especially nuclear. Owners of such plants can be
quite content simply selling this power into the market well above marginal
costs118 and are hesitant to put billions of dollars at risk in new invest-
ments.119  This is particularly problematic for new nuclear energy given its
high upfront costs, discussed supra in Part III.
Several policy tools can help push through the stagnating inertia of
cheap electricity from outdated plants. First, more stringent carbon and
pollution regulations will help push old fossil fuel plant operators to invest
in new technology. Second, the NRC is currently extending existing 40-
year nuclear plant licenses for another 20 years, and there is talk of one day
extending for another 20 years (for a total of 80 years).120 The NRC should
commit now to refusing the second round of license extensions to deliver a
clear policy message to drive innovation while providing plant operators
with 20 years to prepare alternate plans.121 Finally, as proposed below, Con-
struction Work in Progress allowances and Integrated Resource Planning,
discussed infra, would bring both policy and economic factors to bear in
regulated markets to incentivize capital investment in innovative and so-
cially responsible generation sources.
118. This is true given the Dutch auction nature of many wholesale energy markets. See,
e.g, MOREY, supra note 117, at 4.
119. See Wald, supra note 5.
120. See U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY CO M M’N, supra note 5; Wald, supra note 5.
121. It is appropriate to refuse further licensing extensions because these plant operators
have received their initially anticipated 40 years of useful life out of the plants, plus an extra
20 years to earn profits.  One feature of the regulatory compact is that once cost recovery
and reasonable profit have been achieved, old technology should be retired so new technol-
ogy can benefit from the same process.  Without this turnover, incumbent operators will
receive a windfall and technological advances will be delayed. In another 40–60 years, plant
operators of advanced nuclear should have recovered costs and earned reasonable profits.
New and improved technology will likely be available and should be implemented.
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B. Construction Work in Progress
An allowance for Construction Work in Progress (CWIP) would incen-
tivize advanced nuclear by permitting utility companies to begin billing
ratepayers for construction costs when construction begins, rather than wait
until the plant comes online.122 This can save billions in financing costs by
limiting compounding interest.123 Without CWIP, the utility must pay
compounding interest on its original principal loan plus the accruing inter-
est. Consider if the original loan was for $100 at 10% interest. After the first
interest period (say, one month), the outstanding balance would be $110
($100 principal plus $10 interest). After the second month, the balance
would be $121 ($110 principal/interest plus $11 interest). After the third
month, it would be $133.10 ($121 principal/interest plus $12.10 interest). By
the fourth month, it would be $146.41 ($133.10 principal/interest plus
$13.31 interest). Not only does the balance increase each month, but the
amount of interest owed each month grows exponentially as the balance
grows. The first month was $10, then $11, then $12.10, then $13.31. Imagine
these numbers are millions and billions of dollars and it should be clear how
the cost of capital snowballs.
Under a CWIP regime, the growth in interest payments would be lim-
ited and perhaps eliminated, depending on the administration of CWIP.
Rather than interest growing from $10 to $11, $12.10, $13.31 and so on,
interest payments would remain constant at $10, or perhaps even shrink
from $10 down to $9, $8, etc. This adjustment would save substantial sums
on the cost of capital for the project. Each ratepayer would chip in a small
amount of money to finance the project in real-time, offsetting the other-
wise exponential cost of borrowing. Ratepayers’ rates would increase earlier
than they would absent a CWIP regime, but the overall additional cost is
less because of the avoided interest payments that would have otherwise
accrued between the beginning of construction and the plant coming online.
Critics of CWIP argue that what the ratepayers gain from reduced
long-term electricity rates, they sacrifice in return on investment that could
be earned if their money was otherwise invested from the time of payment
to project completion. This ignores the bigger picture. First, the amount in
question is not huge—if 1.8 million customers chipped in to offset the inter-
est on a $1 billion project with a 10% annual interest rate, for example, there
122. See NUCLEAR ENERGY INST., CONSTRUCTION WORK IN PROGRESS: AN EFFECTIVE FINANCIAL
TOOL TO LOWER THE COST OF ELECTRICITY (2012), http://www.nei.org/CorporateSite/media/file
folder/CWIP.pdf?ext=.pdf.
123. Id. (estimating that allowances for CWIP will save Georgia ratepayers approxi-
mately $2 billion in financing costs on two nuclear reactors currently under construction, or
approximately 15% of the projected total cost).
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would be approximately $8.3 million in monthly interest payments. Cus-
tomers’ rates would increase by about $5 per month or $60 per year.124
Assuming a customer invested that $60 elsewhere instead of paying it to-
ward CWIP, he would be lucky to earn 1% annually in a savings account,
and a long-term average of 6–7% in the market with more risky
investments.125
Second, consider what ratepayers gain. By paying early at a rate of $5
per month or $60 per year, ratepayers would offset $8.3 million in monthly
interest, or $104.7 million in annual interest. Now, $8.3 million times 12
months only equals $99.6 million. The difference between $104.7 million
and $99.6 million is $5.1 million, which represents the compounded interest
avoided by making interest payments every month.  Dividing $5.1 million
across 1.8 million customers equals $2.83 per customer. So, by paying about
$60 per year to offset the utility’s interest, ratepayers can save $2.83 per
ratepayer per year in avoided interest, or about 5% annual return. Absent
the CWIP, the $60 and the $2.83 would be paid by ratepayers in the future.
With CWIP, only the $60 is paid and the $2.83 can be avoided. Compare
that 5% to the 1% or less the ratepayer would have earned by keeping their
money in a savings account or 7% in the stock market. While 5% is not as
good as the “average” rate of return on stock market investment, there are
other factors involved: this is a relatively small sum of money for which
market returns are negligible in terms of long-term finances, and gradually
funding long-term energy solutions will be less disruptive to customers than
potential price shocks from climate or energy emergencies.
Consider also that a new advanced nuclear plant would reduce carbon
emissions and other pollutants, reduce coal mining and natural gas fracking,
and provide macroeconomic stimulus through technology innovations.126
Recent studies provide estimates of the social cost of releasing one ton of
124. $8.3 million divided by 1.8 million customers equals roughly $5 per month. Multi-
plied by 12 months, the total reaches $60.
125. See, e.g., National Highest Money Market Account Rates – Best Savings Rates, BAN-
KRATE, http://www.bankrate.com (last visited Mar. 22, 2016); Trent Hamm, Average Stock
Market Return: Where Does 7% Come From, THE SIMPLE DOLLAR (Sept. 12, 2014), http://
www.thesimpledollar.com/where-does-7-come-from-when-it-comes-to-long-term-stock-
returns.
126. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, ASSESSING THE MULTIPLE BENEFITS OF CLEAN ENERGY
140–41 (2011), https://www3.epa.gov/statelocalclimate/documents/pdf/epa_assessing_bene
fits.pdf. While jobs would be lost in fossil fuel industries, they would be gained elsewhere:
directly in the nuclear industry; less directly through derivative applications of nuclear-re-
lated research and development; and generally through the economic stimulus generated by
disruptive energy technology.
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carbon dioxide into the air that range from $37 to $220 per ton.127 In Mich-
igan, for example, three nuclear plants avoided the release of 26.85 million
metric tons of carbon dioxide, which would have imposed social costs of
$993 million to $5.9 billion based on the savings per ton discussed in those
studies.128 This does not account for other pollutants released by burning
fossil fuels and their effects on public health and the environment, nor the
environmental costs of mining for coal and fracking for natural gas.129
The upshot of all this is not to put a specific cost avoidance price tag on
nuclear development; that would be impossibly speculative. The point is
that modest investments today, spread gradually across all ratepayers, can
have reverberating long-term benefits. In purely financial terms, these in-
vestments avoid interest-on-interest, benefiting ratepayers in long-term cost
avoidance. Expanding the calculus to account for environmental, public
health, and job creation benefits, the modest CWIP costs borne today
should provide generous multifaceted returns to ratepayers. This concept—
long-term benefits through modest near-term investments—is demonstrated
nicely by CWIP, and is a running theme throughout this Note’s proposals.
C. Integrated Resource Planing and Certificates of Necessity
An Integrated Resource Plan (IRP) is a centralized plan organized by a
PSC to anticipate future energy demand and regulate future energy supply
with an ultimate goal of ensuring that future energy needs are met at prices
reasonable to the consumer, but high enough for generators to recover their
costs and earn a reasonable profit.130 Historically, IRPs considered only
load forecasting and least-cost generation, but today’s plans consider addi-
tional factors, including environmental protection and demand-side man-
127. Ker Than, Estimated Social Cost of Climate Change Not Accurate, Stanford Scientists
Say, STANFORD (Jan. 12, 2015), http://news.stanford.edu/pr/2015/pr-emissions-social-costs-
011215.html.
128. BOSSELMAN ET AL., supra note 9, at 210; Nuclear Energy Inst., Emissions Avoided by
the U.S. Nuclear Industry (State by State), KNOWLEDGE CENTER, http://www.nei.org/Knowledge-
Center/Nuclear-Statistics/Environment-Emissions-Prevented/Emissions-Avoided-by-the-
US-Nuclear-Industry (last updated May 2015).
129. See generally Nickolas Z. Muller & Robert Mendelsohn, Weighing the Value of a Ton
of Pollution, 33 REGULATION 20, 25 (2010).
130. See generally FRANK C. GRAVES ET AL., EDISON ELEC. INST., RESOURCE PLANNING AND
PROCUREMENT IN EVOLVING ELECTRICITY MARKETS 3 (2004) (“Some state policy makers, con-
cerned about the past price instability and the future resource adequacy in the restructured
wholesale markets, are expressing a renewed interest in old regulatory tools, such as Inte-
grated Resource Planning (IRP).”); TENN. VALLEY AUTH., ENERGY VISION 2020: INTEGRATED RE-
SOURCE PLANNING ch. 2 (1995), http://152.85.5.80/environment/reports/energyvision2020/; see
also Peter Maloney, Marginal Success, U.S. POWER MARKETS, Dec. 2013, at 49, 51–52.
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agement.131 A properly designed IRP seeks to ensure reliable energy, at
reasonable costs for both ratepayers and power generators, while also con-
sidering policy factors such as environmental protection. An IRP is the es-
sence of a regulatory compact in which free market competition is limited
by government regulators in order to balance the competing desires of relia-
bility, innovation, and economics.132
A key component of an IRP is the Certificate of Necessity (CON),
which is issued by the PSC to a power generator proposing to construct a
new power plant, expand an existing plant, or enter into a long-term PPA.
The specifics of certification can vary by state or region, but CONs gener-
ally aim to provide assurance by the PSC that the capital expended in new
generation or construction may be recovered from ratepayers pursuant to
the rate regulation discussed in supra Section V.A on traditional rate regula-
tion.133 Such assurances may be provided explicitly134 or may be implicit
from a CON that certifies a “need” for the proposed generation, but stops
short of an assurance of recovery.135 Certifying a need for the proposed
generation is a way to limit the supply of electricity to avoid an oversatura-
tion of the marketplace and unsustainably low energy prices that could drive
generators out of business and ultimately lead to electricity shortages and
higher prices.136
CONs thus encourage investment in innovative generation methods by
reducing the investment risk at the outset. However, even for a CON that
assures recovery of costs, some investment risk persists because the assur-
ance generally extends only to the proposed budgeted amount—cost over-
runs cannot necessarily be recovered from ratepayers.137 CONs are provided
after extensive consideration by the PSC of the proposed generation, alter-
131. GRAVES ET AL., supra note 130, at 6.
132. Karen Gould, Integrated Resource Planning for Electric Power, slide 18 (Aug. 3–7,
2009), http://pubs.naruc.org/pub/5383B7D3-2354-D714-51CA-BF2EB9D711D7 (providing
that “[r]egulation substitutes for competition” and “[a]ttempts to mimic a perfectly competi-
tive market as much as possible”).
133. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 460.6s(3) (2008).
134. Id. § 460.6s(3)(d) (explaining that one type of CON provides an assurance that the
estimated purchase or capital costs “will be recoverable in rates from the electric utility’s
customers”).
135. Id. § 460.6s(3)(a) (explaining that another type of CON is “[a] certificate of neces-
sity that the power to be supplied as a result of the proposed construction, investment, or
purchase is needed”).
136. Low energy prices may sound nice in the short term, but prolonged energy prices
below generation costs would drive generators out of business, especially clean energy gener-
ators with the highest internalized environmental costs, and leave the cheapest energy gener-
ators, which often have high externalized environmental costs.
137. See MICH. COMP. LAWS. § 460.6s(6).
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native generation methods, and competitive landscape.138 New or expanding
generation sources are not required to obtain a CON prior to construction,
but it is certainly advantageous to do so to ensure that costs can be recov-
ered from ratepayers.139
Advanced nuclear is a risky investment proposition given the sheer
amount of capital required, extended payback period, and lack of track re-
cord. Such risks entail substantial financing costs, which compound to make
the project even riskier. Issuance of a CON would reduce the investment
risk at the outset, thereby incentivizing advanced nuclear construction by
utility companies, which would have assurance of cost recovery from rate-
payers.140 The inclusion of environmental and policy considerations in an
IRP would further incentivize investment by utilities in nuclear and other
renewable energy sources.
Despite the regulated nature of an IRP, the process to obtain a CON
ensures that only the most competitive projects receive a CON. An “IRP is
about choosing the lowest cost among alternatives of like benefits but differ-
ent costs, typically where the alternatives are mutually exclusive and cus-
tomized.”141 In other words, an IRP should balance the priorities of
reliability, environmental concern, and cost—both near-term and long-
term—and choose from least-cost options within each category in a compet-
itive process. There would be competition among different advanced nu-
clear technologies and other energy generation technologies that provide
comparable environmental, reliability, and economic benefits. As discussed
throughout this Note, advanced nuclear hits on all three categories—it pro-
duces reliable power, is environmentally responsible, and is cost efficient
over the long term.
VI. ENERGY INNOVATION IN A DEREGULATED ENERGY MARKET
Advanced nuclear construction projects in a market without utility-
owned generation face the same three core challenges identified above that
plague regulated utilities: (a) the need to raise billions of dollars upfront;
(b) compounding interest at a likely interest-rate premium; and (c) a long
repayment horizon. Additionally, IPPs lack the regulatory tools discussed
138. See id. § 460.6s(11)(f).
139. See, e.g., id. § 460.6s(1) (providing that the utility “may” submit an application for a
CON); id. § 460.6s(8) (providing that if the commission denies the CON, the utility may
continue construction without the assurances of a CON).
140. However, the cost recovery assurances from a CON generally only apply to budg-
eted costs. The typical utility is responsible for overruns, thereby limiting the potential
moral hazard. See id. § 460.6s(6).
141. GRAVES ET AL., supra note 130.
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above that could incentivize advanced nuclear in a regulated market.142 So,
IPPs need to raise money from the capital markets using free-market
principles.
This section lays out three suggestions that can help encourage capital-
intensive innovation by IPPs. First, catalytic first-loss capital can help re-
duce investment risk, thereby incentivizing investment from a wider range
of sources and reducing the cost of capital. Second, securitization of plant
assets can improve the liquidity of investments. Third, adjustments to the
way in which energy markets operate can enable earlier recognition of fu-
ture power sales, helping to address the capital timing issue.
Free market purists may take issue with the government assistance pro-
posed, but this would ignore the government assistance that led to the cur-
rent status quo. Early nuclear technology would not have been possible
without the support of major government programs during the 1960s.143
And fossil fuels also have enjoyed a long history of government subsidies.144
Completely eliminating government assistance from energy innovation es-
sentially amounts to a new barrier to market entry that even Chicago
School adherents would agree provides an unfair advantage.145
A. Catalytic First-Loss Capital
Catalytic first-loss capital (CFLC) is a tiered capital deployment strat-
egy designed to stimulate investment in promising—yet unproven—ven-
tures by temporarily using government funds to improve the risk-return
profile, thereby incentivizing others to invest.146 Absent CFLC (or rate reg-
142. Recall that IPP stands for Independent Power Producer. IPPs are typically large
utility companies that operate as regulated utilities in some states and as IPPs in other states.
Jun Ishii, From Investor-Owned Utility to Independent Power Producer, 27 ENERGY J. 65, 66
(2006).
143. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Org., Manhattan Project, HISTORY OF NU-
CLEAR TESTING, http://www.ctbto.org/nuclear-testing/history-of-nuclear-testing/manhattan-
project/ (last visited Mar. 22, 2016) (providing that the Manhattan Project, which was
funded by the United States government and played an important role in the development of
nuclear energy, cost nearly $2 billion, or approximately $34 billion in 2016 dollars).
144. Jeff Johnson, Long History of U.S. Energy Subsidies, 89 CHEMICAL & ENGINEERING
NEWS 30, 30 (2011) (providing that “[t]he first 15 years . . . are critical to developing new
technologies,” and, further, that “oil and gas subsidies, including tax breaks and government
spending, were about five times as much as aid to renewables during their first 15 years of
development”).
145. DAN CRANE, ANTITRUST 35 (2014) (“One of the key tenets of the Chicago School is
that only expenses incurred by new entrants but not by incumbents should be considered
entry barriers.”).
146. Much of the discussion of catalytic first-loss capital in this Note is based on AMIT
BOURI & ABHILASH MUDALIAR, GLOBAL IMPACT INV. NETWORK, CATALYTIC FIRST-LOSS CAPITAL
(2013).
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ulation), an investment in unproven advanced nuclear energy would be too
risky for most institutional capital market participants. Any that did partici-
pate would likely require extraordinary interest rate premiums. Some ven-
ture capital firms might be willing to invest, but venture capital alone is
unlikely to provide the billions necessary to finance advanced nuclear.147
CFLC can adjust the risk profile by structuring investments into different
tiers with different risk/reward outcomes tailored to meet the needs of each
participant in the tier.148 This would enable advanced nuclear projects to
tap into $18 trillion in institutional retirement funds (pension funds, IRAs,
401(k) plans, etc.).149 Expanding the pool of financing should help to raise
the money necessary, and at a lower interest rate.
FIGURE 3: STRUCTURE OF A CATALYTIC FIRST-LOSS CAPITAL
TRANSACTION
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Capital Markets 
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retirement) 
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147. The Daily Startup: Venture Investors Back Nuclear Energy After a Lull, WALL ST. J.:
VENTURE CAPITAL DISPATCH (Aug. 15, 2014, 9:31 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/venturecapital/
2014/08/15/the-daily-startup-venture-investors-back-nuclear-energy-after-a-lull/. In 2014,
venture firms invested $1.5 million and $2 million, respectively, in Helion Energy Inc. and
Transatomic Power Corp, which are startup nuclear energy companies. Id. Such small
amounts of money would certainly help advanced nuclear companies, but are insufficient for
even a Prototype of Helion’s proposed generator, which it estimates would cost between
$30–50 million. Id. The article also notes that there was no venture fund investment in
nuclear in 2013 or 2012, and only $2.87 million total in 2011. See also Katie Fehrenbacher,
How Startups Can Save Nuclear Tech, FORTUNE (July 6, 2015) (providing that there are a num-
ber of nuclear startups with modest funding success, but acknowledging the shortfall be-
tween venture funding and the billions needed for commercialization).
148. Id. at 3–4.
149. TOWERS WATSON, GLOBAL PENSION ASSETS STUDY 2014, at 6 (2014).  This Note is cer-
tainly not proposing that all $18 trillion be invested in advanced nuclear.  One-tenth of one
percent (0.1%) of this value would be $18 billion, a potentially transformational amount of
capital for advanced nuclear.
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Figure 3 illustrates the structure of CFLC for a $5–7 billion project.
First, an organization—traditionally government, a foundation, or other
non-governmental organization—contributes $1 billion in “first-loss” capital.
This money is often viewed as a grant, though there is strong potential for
repayment over the long-term. Second, participants from the nuclear indus-
try150 invest in the venture through equity interests, which traditionally
serve a first-loss purpose, but here serve as second-loss capital. With these
first- and second-loss tiers in place, the risk profile of the venture is sub-
stantially reduced for top-tier participants. The venture can seek additional
financing from the capital markets, including the $18 trillion in institutional
retirement accounts.
The specific instrument for institutional funds to invest in CFLC
would likely be commercial debt instruments. Without the government’s
CFLC, these investments would probably be too risky for institutional in-
vestors, which are often constrained by certain risk-adjusted return manage-
ment policies on their investments.151  However, the CFLC essentially
serves as a partial loan guarantee, thereby improving the risk-adjusted re-
turn profile to enable institutional investment.
Gains and losses are applied inversely. As the project comes online and
begins to make money, the top-tier debt will be paid off with modest inter-
est.152 This is consistent with “normal” (i.e., non-CFLC) public debt issu-
ance—debtholders enjoy relatively little risk due to their claim priority, and
therefore receive only modest returns.153 In the case of CFLC, the outcome
should be the same as a non-CFLC debt issuance in a more traditional (i.e.,
less risky) energy investment. That is the whole point—the first-loss govern-
ment capital reduces the risk of the debt offering to be in line with tradi-
tional debt offerings.154
Once debtholders are paid off, dividends will flow to the nuclear indus-
try equity holders; specifically, companies already engaged in the owner-
ship, operation, and construction of nuclear plants. As discussed above,
utility companies in one state often own generation assets in other states,
where they function as IPPs, rather than regulated utilities.155 These partici-
150. These nuclear participants would probably be IPPs that operate other nuclear
plants, either at regulated utilities or IPPs (depending on the states in which they operate).
151. Dorothy Franzen, Managing Investment Risk in Defined Benefit Pension Funds 48
(OECD, Working Papers on Insurance and Private Pensions No. 38, 2010) (“In the United
States, ‘prudence’ is interpreted along the lines of financial economics, i.e. maximising risk-
adjusted returns.”).
152. See BOURI & MUDALIAR, supra note 146, at 8–9.
153. See id.
154. See id.
155. See Ishii, supra note 142.
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pants took on a substantial risk by investing $2 billion in equity capital,
subordinated to public debtholders, and they should enjoy the commensu-
rate reward of owning a nuclear power plant that can generate electricity for
40 or more years with very low marginal costs. Notably, these are precisely
the participants that should own advanced nuclear plants since they will be
the ones with the expertise to operate the plants.
The notion of tapping institutional retirement funds may raise some
eyebrows, but consider what these funds are currently doing. CalPERS, the
California Public Employees’ Retirement System, is one of the largest pen-
sion funds in the world, managing over $300 billion in assets at the end of
2014.156 Of that $300 billion, approximately $15 billion was held in publicly
issued corporate debt similar to the debt proposed in this Note.157 The
money raised by these corporate bonds helps to finance capital-intensive
projects (like building new energy generation). CalPERS holds debt in
companies ranging from Verizon Wireless to Hawaiian Airlines to the
Wynn casinos, including $85 million in Duke Energy,158 the largest utility
in the United States.159 CalPERS even has $600 million invested in a fund
specifically designed to target North American power investments.160 In
short, the CFLC debt suggested in this Note is generally consistent with
the business-as-usual investing of institutional retirement funds. Of course,
risks remain (as with any investment in corporate bonds), but the risks
under this CFLC structure should be no different than the risks already
present under the status quo use of institutional retirement funds.161
Importantly, government CFLC is meant to be catalytic and temporary,
not a permanent financing structure for nuclear power. A primary problem
with investment in advanced nuclear right now is its uncertainty and lack of
track record. CFLC helps to get the first handful of projects off the ground
by providing a risk-mitigating counterbalance, while still requiring the ulti-
mate beneficiaries to put skin in the game. Once several advanced nuclear
projects with CFLC have been completed, there will (hopefully) be a track
record of success such that subsequent projects will require decreasing
156. CAL. PUB. EM P S.’ RETIREMENT SYS., COMPREHENSIVE ANNUAL INVESTMENT REPORT: FIS-
CAL YEAR ENDED JUNE 30, 2014, at 3 (2014).
157. Id. at 46 (providing, under the “Corporate Bonds” heading, a tally of approximately
$15 billion).
158. Id. at 21.
159. N.Y. Times, Markets: Utilities – Electric, BUSINESS DAY, http://mar-
kets.on.nytimes.com/research/markets/usmarkets/industry.asp?industry=59111 (last visited
Mar. 22, 2015).
160. Press Release, Harbert Mgmt. Corp., HMC Affiliate Gulf Pacific Power, LLC
Acquires Interest in New York City Power Plant (Oct. 18, 2013), http://www.harbert.net/
wp-content/uploads/2013/10/GPP-Astoria-Energy-II-Press-Release.pdf.
161. See BOURI & MUDALIAR, supra note 146.
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amounts of CFLC in order to provide investors with acceptable risk
profiles, eventually eliminating the need for government CFLC altogether.
B. Securitization
A long repayment period is an additional issue for advanced nuclear. A
huge amount of money is needed upfront, with ultimate repayment and
profit to occur over decades. Even with strategies to mitigate the levelized
cost of capital, there still may be a timing issue for many investors. The
securitization aspect of publicly-issued CFLC debt of advanced nuclear
projects can provide a path to monetization for investors even before the
plant comes online, and well before the potential 30–40 years required for
repayment from energy revenue.162
Securitization refers to the process of dividing an asset or company into
shares that can be bought and sold as a security, thereby providing some
liquidity to the investment.163 Consider the benefits of securitizing a ven-
ture to build a hypothetical advanced nuclear plant, Jet Nuclear. Early on,
when Jet Nuclear is in its infancy, the resale value of that debt would be
discounted due to the various project risks (technology, regulatory, etc.). As
Jet Nuclear progresses—clearing regulatory and construction milestones—
the resale value of that debt will increase as the project risks decline. On
one hand, the holder of that debt should want to keep the debt as Jet Nu-
clear shows increasing promise. But the holder may have other liquidity or
strategic needs and may want to sell Jet Nuclear debt to another investor in
order to monetize her initial gains. The buying investor may not have been
interested in the risk of Jet Nuclear debt at the outset, but with certain
milestones already attained, the risk may be reduced to acceptable levels for
that buyer.164
162. The concepts discussed in this section are similar to the strategies employed by
SunEdison and other solar yieldco’s.  SunEdison is facing potential bankruptcy, reportedly
due to mismanagement of its rapid growth.  In essence, SunEdison’s securitization of its
solar assets worked too well—raising approximately $10 billion—and its management was
unable to maintain sufficient oversight and quality standards. See, e.g., Liz Hoffman, Inside
the Fall of SunEdison, Once a Darling of the Clean-Energy World, Wall St. J. (Apr. 14, 2016).
163. See Securitization, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/07/
securitization.asp (last visited Mar. 22, 2016); How Does Securitization Increase Liquidity?,
INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/042115/how-does-securitization-in-
crease-liquidity.asp (last visited Mar. 22, 2016).
164. During the recent mortgage-backed security recession, this strategy was irresponsi-
bly employed through derivative positions in an unsuccessful attempt to diversify the risk
out of mortgage-backed securities. This Note makes no argument for securitization as a
means of diversification. However, there is one securitization lesson from the recent reces-
sion that does apply—liquidity risk. Just because something can be securitized (i.e., divided
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The converse also applies. Perhaps there is a moderate investment risk
at the outset, and Jet Nuclear fails to reach certain milestones in time. The
value of the debt goes down and the initial debt holder wants to cut its
losses. A more risk-tolerant buyer may see value in the depressed debt and
be willing to buy it from the initial debt holder at a discount. The initial
buyer still takes a loss (as can happen with any investment), but is not stuck
holding the debt long-term.
Securities in advanced nuclear ventures can be sold as registered public
securities or as exempt private offerings. Public registration is costly and
increases potential regulatory enforcement liability,165 but this cost should
be manageable relative to the overall project cost and would likely provide
the most liquidity. On the other hand, private offering options include a
Rule 506 offering under Regulation D, a Rule 144 offering, or a Rule 144A
offering, although restrictions on resale could limit the liquidity from such
private offerings.166
C. Energy and Capacity Markets
There are two priorities for advanced nuclear that are more important
than maximizing profit: (a) offsetting high upfront costs by early monetiza-
tion of future energy production and capacity; and (b) decreasing uncer-
tainty at the time of investment by increasing the predictability of future
revenue. Without these two considerations, an advanced nuclear project
may never get off the ground, and there will be no profit to maximize.  To
achieve these priorities, advanced nuclear generators can and should trans-
act in the existing capacity and energy markets—specifically, capacity sales,
exchange-traded electricity futures, and exchange-traded electricity
options.167
into shares, bought, and sold), doesn’t mean that there will always be a market for that
product. Without willing buyers, the security is not worth anything.
165. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (2012).
166. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2015) (providing, in general, for a private placement offering
to accredited investors); 17 C.F.R. § 230.144 (2015) (providing, in general, for the sale of
restricted or controlled securities); 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A (2015) (providing, in general, for a
private placement offering to qualified institutional investors).
167. See, e.g., Capacity Market (RPM), PJM, http://learn.pjm.com/three-priorities/buy-
ing-and-selling-energy/capacity-markets.aspx (last visited Mar. 4, 2016); Adam James, How a
Capacity Market Works, THE ENERGY COLLECTIVE (June 14, 2013), http://www.theenergycollec
tive.com/adamjames/237496/energy-nerd-lunch-break-how-capacity-market-works-and-why-
it-matters.
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1. Capacity Markets
The difference between energy and capacity is that energy is the power
actually produced, sold, and consumed, whereas capacity is a prepaid com-
mitment to be ready to produce energy at some point in the future.168 For
example, a generator would sell capacity into the market in January of Year
1 and collect $X in exchange for a commitment to produce Y amount of
power during January of Year 2. In January of Year 2, the generator would
actually produce Y amount of energy (if necessary based on grid demand)
and sell that energy for $Z, a price determined by real-time market forces.
So the generator would collect revenue twice—once in Year 1 when selling
capacity and once in Year 2 when selling the energy ($X + $Z).
There are two main benefits to generators from capacity markets. First,
they allow for some monetization of future power generation in Year 1, as
demonstrated by the above example. Second, they provide for a second rev-
enue stream, beyond just energy sales, to compensate for the “missing
money” problem—a well-documented phenomenon in which prices paid to
energy suppliers are below the levels needed to sustain existing generation
and incentivize new entry.169 This subsection will focus mainly on the first
benefit. While the second benefit is important, it is beyond the scope of this
Note.
Capacity markets typically operate up to three years in advance, though
some markets are limited to only a few months.170 There are typically ad-
justment periods near the time of actual capacity need, during which time
excess capacity can be resold into the market to be purchased by entities
with a projected shortfall in capacity.171
Extending capacity markets beyond three years—to, say, 40 years172—
would enable clean energy generators to monetize more of their capacity
earlier in the plant’s life.173 In Year 1 of a project (or pre-construction), the
generation plant could sell capacity for the next 40 years, receiving substan-
tial revenue to offset high construction and interest costs and mitigate the
168. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 167.
169. See, e.g., PETER J. MAKOVICH ET AL., POWER SUPPLY COST RECOVERY BRIDGING THE MISS-
ING MONEY GAP (2013).
170. PJM, supra note 167.
171. See Forward Capacity Market, ISO NEW ENGLAND, http://www.iso-ne.com/markets-
operations/markets/forward-capacity-market (last visited Mar. 4, 2016).
172. Forty years is somewhat arbitrary, but was chosen to reflect the current license
period of a nuclear power plant. The important point is to significantly extend markets to
better reflect the lifetime of the generation assets for which the markets are supposed to
provide price signals. See generally Maloney, supra note 130.
173. It would also encounter potential issues and risks, addressed in Subsection VI.C.3,
infra.
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capital timing problem discussed in Part III, supra, similar to the benefits of
CWIP.
This would also send more accurate price signals to indicate when new
generation should be built, somewhat akin to an IRP and CON, discussed
in Section V.C. supra.174 Long-term price signals would provide increased
certainty in Year 1 (or pre-construction) that future energy from that gener-
ation asset would be needed and purchased by the market at a high enough
price to warrant construction in the first place. Such price signals would
help encourage investment by reducing uncertainty at the outset about the
future energy sales and revenue from that plant.
There would be increased costs to ratepayers by extending the capacity
markets. Load serving entities (LSEs)175 purchase capacity to satisfy regula-
tory and consumer demands for reliability.176 These costs are currently
passed on to ratepayers in their energy bills.177 Thus, the early monetization
realized by advanced nuclear would be funded by ratepayers. But this is
comparable to CWIP, discussed supra in Section V.B., for regulated utili-
ties. Recall the long-term benefits to ratepayers from paying a modest
amount early—offsetting compounding interest, plus driving clean-energy
innovation to reduce climate change and fossil fuel pollution while also
stimulating the economy.
In sum, the primary benefit of extending capacity markets further into
the future is that it would provide earlier monetization of future energy
capacity, which would encourage investment in advanced nuclear and other
renewable energy technologies with high upfront costs by offsetting com-
pounding financing costs. A second benefit is that it would help provide
long-term price signals to reduce investment risk at the outset. The down-
side for consumers is that there would be increases in current energy bills as
future energy capacity is paid for today, rather than further down the road.
However, as discussed in the CWIP section, paying early does not necessa-
rily mean paying more. Consider credit card or student loan debt—these
174. ELEC. POWER SUPPLY ASSOC., GETTING THE BEST DEAL FOR ELECTRIC UTILITY CUSTOMERS,
at v (2004).
175. Load Serving Entities, ERCOT, http://www.ercot.com/services/rq/lse (last visited
Mar. 22, 2016) (providing that “[l]oad serving entities (LSEs) provide electric service to
end-users and wholesale customers,” and further explaining that “LSEs include the competi-
tive retailers (CRs) that sell electricity at retail in the competitive market,” which include
“(1) a retail electric provider (REP), which contracts with qualified scheduling entities to
provide scheduling services for their load customers, or (2) a municipally owned utility or
co-operative that opts to offer customer choice (an opt-in entity)”).
176. Adam James, How a Capacity Market Works, THE ENERGY COLLECTIVE (June 14, 2013),
http://theenergycollective.com/adamjames/237496/energy-nerd-lunch-break-how-capacity-
market-works-and-why-it-matters.
177. Id.
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costs would come due at some point, but the longer the delay in payment,
the higher the ultimate balance.
2. Exchange-Traded Energy Futures and Options
Exchange-traded energy futures and options are standardized derivative
contracts, primarily traded on the New York Mercantile Exchange
(NYMEX).178  An energy option refers to a contract in which the genera-
tor/seller commits to sell X amount of power at $Y cost on N date in the
future, but only if the buyer chooses to exercise the option.179 It is very
similar to capacity, except that there is a fixed price term (a strike price).
The buyer pays a fee upfront, $Z, for the option to buy X amount of energy
at $Y cost on N date.180 If the market price on N date is higher than $Y (the
strike price), then the buyer would exercise its option and pay the seller $Y
for X amount of energy. If the market price on N date is lower than $Y,
then the buyer would decline to exercise the option, and would instead buy
energy on the open market.181 In this case, the generator/seller could bid its
energy into the real-time market, while still keeping $Z in revenue from the
initial sale of the option.
The benefits of energy options for advanced nuclear are similar to those
provided by capacity markets—early monetization and better price signals
for future power needs. There is an additional benefit in the slightly in-
creased predictability of future energy prices. Because there is a known
strike price for the option, Y, the generator knows that it won’t sell energy
higher than Y, though it may sell lower if the market goes down. This is not
ideal—the seller would prefer to know the minimum price that it will re-
ceive for a guaranteed amount of power, but knowing a ceiling still provides
some predictability that is helpful for projecting revenues and reducing in-
vestment risk. A negative forecast can also discourage unnecessary or un-
profitable construction, thereby avoiding bad investments that would create
negative precedent for advanced nuclear.
An energy future is a contract in which the seller or generator agrees to
sell, and the buyer agrees to purchase, X amount of power for $Y on N date.
The futures contract differs from an option in that the buyer is obligated to
178. See generally GREGORY PRICE, CME GROUP, STREAMLINING THE NYMEX POWER SLATE
(2015); Shijie Deng & Shmuel S. Oren, Electricity Derivatives and Risk Management, 31 EN-
ERGY 940, 942 (2006).
179. Deng & Oren, supra note 178, at 944–45; Options Contract, INVESTOPEDIA, http://
www.investopedia.com/terms/o/optionscontract.asp (last visited Mar. 22, 2016).
180. Options Contract, INVESTOPEDIA, supra note 179.
181. Id.
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purchase.182 Therefore, the buyer generally would not pay anything upfront,
eliminating the early monetization benefit.183  However, energy futures can
provide substantial certainty about the amount and price of guaranteed fu-
ture energy sales, thereby encouraging investment in advanced nuclear by
enabling more reliable projections of future revenue.184
Buyers of energy options and futures would likely be LSEs or energy-
intensive industries that want to hedge their risks against future energy
price spikes.185 For example, energy costs comprise twenty to forty percent
of the cost of manufacturing steel.186 Who knows what energy prices will be
like in ten years, let alone forty years? Energy options and futures can pro-
vide some certainty.
Exchange-traded energy products are generally preferable to over-the-
counter (OTC)187 products because exchange-traded products reduce trans-
action costs and information asymmetries. For example, an OTC partici-
pant would need to spend time shopping around to several sellers
comparing prices and terms—transaction costs. Or, the buyer would just
accept the first seemingly reasonable offer—a likely information asymme-
try.188 Direct contracting in this way is also likely to produce non-standard-
ized contracts, which would be difficult to resell or unwind if necessary.189
Trading standardized energy contracts on an exchange provides more trans-
182. Futures Contract, NASDAQ, http://www.nasdaq.com/investing/glossary/f/futures-
contract (last visited Mar. 4, 2016).
183. See Reem Heakal, Futures Fundamentals: Characteristics, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.in
vestopedia.com/university/futures/futures4.asp (last visited Mar. 4, 2016) (discussing margin
requirements for trading in futures contracts, which could require some upfront payment by
the energy generators in order to enter a futures contract).
184. Deng & Oren, supra note 178, at 942 (noting that “these power contracts play the
primary roles in offering future price discovery and price certainty to generators and
LSEs”).
185. Note that energy would not literally be delivered from seller to buyer. Instead, the
parties would generally “cash settle.” Assuming the market price is higher than the strike
price, the seller would sell its power into the market, collect its revenue, then pay the buyer
the difference between market and strike price. Id. at 944.
186. WORLD STEEL ASS’N, FACT SHEET: ENERGY USE IN THE STEEL INDUSTRY (2015), https://
www.worldsteel.org/publications/fact-sheets/content/02/text_files/file0/document/fact_ener
gy_2014.pdf.
187. Int’l Swaps & Derivatives Ass’n, OTC Derivatives: Benefits to U.S. Companies,
Slide 2, 9 (May 2009) (providing that an OTC derivative transaction occurs outside of a
centralized exchange, often bilaterally between parties).
188. Information Asymmetry, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/a/asym-
metricinformation.asp (last visited Mar. 4, 2016) (“A situation in which one party in a trans-
action has more or superior information compared to another.”).
189. INT’L SWAPS & DERIVATIVES ASS’N, TREASURY’S PROPOSAL MANDATING CLEARING OF “STAN-
DARDIZED” SWAPS 2 (2009) (“[C]ontract standardization and the fungibility created by the
clearinghouse guarantee facilitates trading and price discovery.”).
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parency (mitigating information asymmetry), improves efficiency (mitigat-
ing transaction costs), and produces fungible contracts that could be resold
(improving liquidity) or unwound if desired.190
3. Risks
Counterparty risk is present in any of the three energy contracts dis-
cussed above. There is risk that one side or the other will not pay (or exist)
ten or forty years down the road when the contract comes due. This risk can
be mitigated through a surety bond, insurance, or margin calls on exchange-
traded products, which, admittedly, have the downside of increasing trans-
action costs. For generators, another mitigating factor in the event that a
buyer no longer exists is the ability to simply sell that energy into the then-
existing energy markets.  For buyers of energy and capacity, the
counterparty risk that the seller (advanced nuclear generator) may go bank-
rupt or otherwise not deliver energy as previously agreed upon will proba-
bly manifest as a discount on the contract price proportional to the buyer’s
concerns about the seller’s future prospects. For the seller, this is acceptable
so long as the agreed upon price allows for sufficient future revenue, early
monetization, and improved predictability.
In the event that energy prices plummet, the buyer could attempt to
invoke the “just and reasonable” doctrine to legally escape the terms of the
contract.191 However, the Mobile-Sierra presumption of validity in energy
contracts negotiated by two sophisticated actors should mitigate the concern
of a court condoning a breach due to unjust or unreasonable rates.192
CONCLUSION
Collective action is essential to meaningful innovation in energy gener-
ation. As both a moral imperative and pragmatic necessity, ratepayers
should begin to gradually foot this bill now, rather than let economic, envi-
ronmental, and public health costs continue to accrue for future genera-
tions. Modest investments today should provide long- and short-term
benefits across society—baseload diversity, reliability, energy independence,
and environmental stewardship, to name a few. Moreover, clean energy
presents an important means of driving the world economy through the 21st
190. Id.
191. See United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Mobile Gas Serv. Corp., 350 U.S. 332 (1956);
Fed. Power Comm’n v. Sierra Pac. Power Co., 350 U.S. 348 (1956). The Mobile-Sierra doc-
trine was clarified in Morgan Stanley Capital Group, Inc. v. Public Utility District No. 1 of
Snohomish County, 554 U.S. 527 (2008), and refined in NRG Power Marketing v. Maine Public
Utilities Commission, 558 U.S. 165, 174–75 (2010).
192. See Mobile Gas, 350 U.S. 332; Sierra Pacific Power, 350 U.S. 348.
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MEA\5-2\MEA205.txt unknown Seq: 39 18-MAY-16 14:07
Spring 2016] Financing Advanced Nuclear Energy 539
and into the 22nd centuries, ideally with the United States leading the way.
Such technology will be highly valued as countries grapple with fuel
shortages and pollution, while derivative technologies in materials science,
radiology, software, and construction (among others) can drive innovation
in healthcare, defense, manufacturing, transportation, and other critical in-
dustries. Developing clean, renewable energy is poised to be the primary
challenge for coming generations and requires solutions on a societal and
intergenerational scale. The proposals in this Note are intended to make
such investments economically attractive in order to facilitate long-term
benefits for future generations while also stimulating near-term economic
growth and environmental stewardship.
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